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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974-DISMISSAL
SANCTION FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH THE ACT: DEFINING THE
RANGE OF DISTRICT COURTS'
DISCRETION TO DISMISS
CASES WITH PREJUDICE
United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Taylor,' the United States Supreme Court for
the first time addressed the application of the dismissal sanction of
the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.2 The Court resolved several, but not
all, of the ambiguities in the statute that had led lower courts to
inconsistently interpret and apply the dismissal sanction since it
went into effect in 1980.
The Speedy Trial Act mandates that individuals arrested for
criminal offenses be indicted within thirty days, 3 and that such indi-
viduals be brought to trial within seventy days after the indictment.4
1 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982). The relevant section, § 3162(a)(2), pertains to
dismissal sanctions. It states that:
[i]fa defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit required.., the informa-
tion or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant. The defendant
shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the Government shall
have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclu-
sion of time [permitted by the Act]. In determining whether to dismiss the case with
or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following
factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which
led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this
chapter... and on the administration ofjustice. Failure of the defendant to move
for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall con-
stitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982).
3 § 3161(b) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny information or indictment charg-
ing an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from
the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection
with such charges." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1982).
4 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) states, in pertinent part, that:
[i]n any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence
within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or
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If these time restrictions are not complied with, dismissal of the
charge is mandatory.5 The Act allows the court to exercise its dis-
cretion in determining whether to dismiss the case with or without
prejudice.6 If the case is dismissed with prejudice, reprosecution is
barred. The Act requires that courts be guided in their decisions by
"among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the
offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dis-
missal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of
this chapter and on the administration of justice."7
In deciding to dismiss the charges in Taylor without prejudice,
the Supreme Court clarified several inconsistencies in the interpre-
tation of the dismissal sanction in the district and circuit courts.
The Court held that: (1) there is no presumption that all dismissals
should be with prejudice, or that dismissals without prejudice
should be the exception to the rule;8 (2) simple negligence on the
part of the government in failing to comply with the Act does not
necessarily warrant consideration absent a "truly neglectful atti-
tude," as when bad faith or a pattern of neglect is present;9 and (3)
although the decision whether to dismiss a case with or without prej-
udice is in the district court's discretion, it is subject to reversal if it
fails to indicate that it sufficiently weighed each factor in the balanc-
ing test.' 0 The Court also emphasized that any contribution to the
delay before trial on the part of the defendant weighs heavily in
favor of dismissing the case without prejudice."
This Note explores the interpretations the Court chose to at-
tach to the balancing test factors in light of the legislative history of
the Act and the dual goals it was designed to implement: safeguard-
ing society from a perceived increase in crimes committed by de-
fendants free on bail for extended periods, and giving substance to
defendants' sixth amendment speedy trial rights by ensuring in-
creased consistent judicial treatment.12 Although these goals are in
a sense contradictory, the Court's ruling in Taylor strikes a sensible
balance in protecting each of them.
indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of
the court in which such charge is pending.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1982).
5 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(l)-(2) (1982).
6 18 U.S.C. § 3132(a)(2) (1982).
7 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
8 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2418.
9 Id. at 2420.
10 Id. at 2423.
11 Id. at 2421.
12 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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II. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
The respondent, Larry Lee Taylor, was indicted by a federal
grand jury on July 25, 1984, for conspiracy to distribute cocaine 13
and possession of 400 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute.' 4
He was scheduled for trial in the Western District Court of Wash-
ington on November 19, 1984.15 The seventy day period during
which the prosecution could have properly brought him to trial
under the Act' 6 would have expired the following day. 17
Taylor, however, failed to appear for trial. 18 The court then
issued a bench warrant for his arrest. 19 Seventy-eight days later, on
February 5, 1985, local police officers arrested Taylor in San Mateo
County, California on a petty theft charge. 20
Several factors contributed to a delay in returning Taylor to
Washington to stand trial. On February 7, 1985, two days after his
second arrest, he was transferred to federal custody on a writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum issued by the Northern District Court of
California to secure his testimony as a defense witness in a federal
narcotics prosecution in San Francisco.2 1 He testified on February
21, and was held for possible recall until the next day, when the case
ended in a mistrial.22
On February 28, 1985, all California charges against Taylor
were dismissed.23 The United States Marshal Service (USMS) was
notified of this on the next day, March 1.24 The United States' no-
tice informed the USMS that "effective today [respondent] becomes
your prisoner." 25
On March 6, Taylor appeared before a magistrate of the North-
ern District Court of California in connection with the Washington
13 Taylor was indicted for this offense under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982).
14 Taylor was indicted for this offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (1982)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1378-79 (9th Cir.
1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988).
15 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2415.
16 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2415.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2413
(1988).
21 Brief for the United States at 2, United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413
(1988)(No. 87-573).
22 Id. at 3.
23 Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1379.
24 Id.
25 Brief for the United States at 3 (citation omitted).
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bench warrant.26 The magistrate scheduled a second hearing for
March 8.27 On that date, the magistrate granted Taylor's request
for a physical examination. 28 At that hearing, defense counsel indi-
cated to the court that he was not in a hurry to have Taylor returned
to Washington. 29 Indeed, he requested the court to set a removal
hearing for a later date, expressing his desire to "keep [Taylor] here
and organize what is gonna happen and talk to [Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney] Wales up in Seattle." 30
A status conference on the removal proceedings was set for
March 18, 1985. 31 At the respondent's request, the court ultimately
set the removal hearing for April 3.32 On that date, Taylor waived
his right to a hearing.33
The magistrate finally signed an order to transport Taylor to
Washington on April 3.34 The USMS, however, deemed it efficient
and economical to wait until it could assemble a number of prison-
ers bound for Oregon and Washington and transport them at the
same time.35 As a result, Taylor did not leave California until two
weeks later, April 17.36 The next day, April 18, while Taylor was
detained in Portland, Oregon, the Northern District Court of Cali-
fornia issued a second writ ordering his return to San Francisco to
testify at the retrial of the federal narcotics prosecution. 37 He was
returned to California from Portland five days later, on April 23.38
On April 24, the Western District Court of Washington issued a
superseding indictment realleging Taylor's narcotics offenses, in-
cluding an indictment for failure to appear at trial.3 9 After testifying
at the federal narcotics retrial, which began on May 7, Taylor was
finally returned to Washington on May 17, 1985.40 This was 180
days after his trial date in Washington, and 102 days after his second
arrest in California.
26 Id. at 3-4.












39 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2415.
40 Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988)
(No. 87-573).
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Before Taylor was to be retried, he moved to dismiss the super-
seding narcotics indictment on the basis of the seventy day time
limit of the Speedy Trial Act.4 1 The district court granted this mo-
tion and dismissed both narcotics counts.42 Taylor pleaded guilty to
the failure to appear count, for which no speedy trial violation was
found. 43
The district court concluded that because only one day had re-
mained on the "speedy trial clock" on November 19, 1984, when
Taylor fled Washington, the government had a single day in which
to bring him to trial. 44 Pursuant to the Act,45 the court excluded a
number of periods from its calculation of speedy trial time.46 The
first was the seventy-eight day period between the respondent's No-
vember 19, 1984 trial date and his second arrest on February 5,
1985. 47 Next, the court excluded the period between February 7
and February 22, 1985, when Taylor was detained both on the Cali-
fornia charges and for the purpose of testifying in the first federal
narcotics trial.4s The court also excluded the period between March
6, when Taylor first appeared on the bench warrant, and April 3,
when the removal hearing took place.49 Finally, the court excluded
a ten-day period during which the USMS reasonably could have
41 Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1982).
42 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2416.
43 Brief for the United States at 5 and n.3.
44 Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1380.
45 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) provides that:
The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within
which an information or indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within
which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defend-
ant, including but not limited to ....
(D) delay resulting from trial with respect to other charges against the
defendant;
(G) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to the transfer of a case or
the removal of any defendant from another district under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure;
(H) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another dis-
trict. ... except that any time consumed in excess often days from the date an order
of removal or an order directing such transportation, and the defendant's arrival at
the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable;
(3)(A) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the de-
fendant or an essential witness."
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) & (3) (1982).
46 Brief for the United States at 6-7.
47 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2415-16. This period was excludable because Taylor was "ab-
sent" under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A). See Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2416 and n.3.
48 Brief for the United States at 6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1).
49 Brief for the United States at 7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(1)(G).
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transported Taylor to Washington. 50 The district court evidently
assumed that the period after April 24 was excludable because of
the superseding indictment. 51
Ultimately, the court concluded that because fifteen non-ex-
cludable days had passed between Taylor's arrest in February and
April 24, the seventy day limit imposed by the Act had been ex-
ceeded by fourteen days. 52 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this
calculation. 53
The government did not ask the Court to review the lower
courts' conclusion that it had violated the Act, which made dismissal
of the narcotics charges mandatory. 54 The issue that remained was
whether the case should be dismissed with or without prejudice in
light of the balancing test. 55
The district court, characterizing the government's conduct as
"lackadaisical," concluded that "justice would be seriously impaired
if the court were not to respond sternly" to the violation, and dis-
missed the case with prejudice to avoid "tacitly condon[ing]" the
government's behavior.56 In a divided opinion, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed this decision. 57 The sole question before the Supreme
Court was whether the district court had abused its discretion in dis-
missing Taylor's case with prejudice.58
III. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
The majority, 59 in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, re-
versed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, and held that the district
50 Brief for the United States at 7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H).
51 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2415 n.2; United States v. Taylor, 812 F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th
Cir. 1987).
52 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2416.
53 Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1386.
54 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2417. In its brief, the United States indicated that the district
court had used a "now-outmoded method of calculating speedy trial time," and that a
violation had not in fact occurred. Brief for the United States at 5 n.4. However, be-
cause the government neither raised that argument below nor pressed it before the
Supreme Court, its merits were not reviewed. Id. at 6 n.4; Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2417 n.6.
55 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2415. The Act requires that courts consider: the seriousness
of the offense; the facts and circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the case; and the
impact of the decision on the administration of the Act and justice in deciding whether
to dismiss the case with or without prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982).
56 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2416 (citation omitted).
57 Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1386.
58 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2415.
59 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justices Blackmun, White, O'Connor and Kennedy made
up the majority. Justice White filed a concurring opinion. Justice Scalia filed an opinion
concurring in all but part II-A of the decision.
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court had abused its discretion in dismissing Taylor with prejudice. 60
This ruling was based on the majority's conclusion that the district
court had "failed to consider all the factors relevant to the choice of
a remedy" for violations of the Act.61
The Court first noted that the Speedy Trial Act lists specific fac-
tors that courts must consider in determining whether to dismiss a
case with or without prejudice. 62 They are, " 'among others .... the
seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case
which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the
administration of [the Act] and on the administration ofjustice.' "63
In addition to these factors, the pertinent legislative history indi-
cated to the Court that the lack or presence of prejudice caused to
the defendant by the delay was a factor that should guide courts in
their choice of remedy.64
After reviewing the legislative history of the Act, the Court con-
cluded that "Congress did not intend any particular type of dismis-
sal to serve as the presumptive remedy for a Speedy Trial Act
violation." 65 Each dismissal decision, concluded the Court, must be
made after an objective balancing of the factors listed in the Act.66
60 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2423.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2419.
63 Id. at 2417 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)).
64 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2418. The Court noted that Representative Dennis, for exam-
ple, sought to establish the relevance of prejudice to the defendant through" 'legislative
history.'" Id. (quoting 120 CoNG. REC. 41795 (1974)). The author of the compromise
amendment, Representative Cohen, agreed that the factor was relevant. Id. (quoting
120 CONG. REc. 41794-95 (1974)). However, he opposed including it in the statutory
text because he was concerned that courts would treat a lack of prejudice to the defend-
ant as dispositive. 108 S. Ct. at 2418 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 41795 (1974)). The Court
also cited United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1178 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1983); and United States v. Bittle, 699 F.2d 1201,
1208 (D.C. Cir. 1983) to support the proposition that the issue of prejudice was
relevant.
65 108 S. Ct. at 2418. The dismissal sanction issue was the subject of considerable
controversy in Congress. Id. Some, for instance, then Representative Mikva, argued
that unless the Act uniformly barred reprosecution, it would be largely ineffective be-
cause prosecutors would often be free to reinstate the case. A. PARTRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TrrLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL Acr OF 1974 32 (1980). Others, such as Sena-
tor McClellan, feared that dismissing all cases with prejudice would allow criminals to
unjustly escape prosecution. Id. The Court concluded that the Act as it stands repre-
sents a compromise between these competing positions. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2418. The
Court found support for this position in Kramer, 827 F.2d at 1176; United States v. Sal-
gado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1267 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 (1986);
United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1266-67 (11 th Cir. 1984); and Caparella, 716 F.2d
at 980. For further discussion of the legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act, see infra
notes 140-90 and accompanying text.
66 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2419.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Court next confirmed that the proper standard for review-
ing lower court decisions pursuant to the dismissal sanction provi-
sion of the Act was whether or not the district court's decision
constituted an abuse of discretion. 67 While recognizing that the fac-
tual findings of a district court are "entitled to substantial deference
and will be reversed only for clear error,"68 the Court stated that
discretion is nonetheless " 'not left to a court's inclination, but to its
judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal princi-
ples.'"69 Thus, said the Court, "[w]hether discretion has been
abused depends ... on the bounds of that discretion and the princi-
ples that guide its exercise." 70
The Court explained that in the Speedy Trial Act, Congress ex-
pressly instructed that courts be guided in their exercise of discre-
tion by a set of specific factors. 71 Therefore, the majority concluded
that district courts must "carefully consider those factors as applied
to the particular case and ... clearly articulate their effect in order to
permit meaningful appellate review." '72 The Court believed that the
district court, however, had failed to "fully explicate its reasons for
dismissing" Taylor's narcotics charges with prejudice.73 Thus, the
Court found it necessary to re-examine the facts of the case and
weigh the balancing test factors anew in order to determine whether
the district court had properly applied them. 74
The majority agreed with the district and appellate courts that
Taylor's narcotics offenses were "serious," 75 a determination which
weighed in favor of dismissing the case without prejudice. The
Court then turned to the second factor, "the circumstances of the
case leading to dismissal." '76 The Court noted that the district court
had attached great weight to this factor. 77 The Court indicated that
the district court had characterized the government's conduct relat-
ing to the delay as "lackadaisical" because of its unexcused failure to
make "any particular show of concern" and to "respon[d] with dis-
patch" to the court order to return Taylor to Washington. 78
67 Id.
68 Id. (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)).
69 Id. at 2419 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,416 (1975)(cita-
tions omitted).
70 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2419.
71 Id.
72 Id.




77 Id. at 2421.
78 Id. at 2420.
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The majority rejected the district court's interpretation of the
facts in Taylor, and its conclusion that the government's conduct
supported a dismissal of the case with prejudice. 79 Although it
agreed that the conduct of the government should be considered in
the balancing test, in the Court's view, there was no evidence of a
"truly neglectful attitude" on the part of the government.8 0 The
Court considered it significant that the district court had not found
that the government had acted in bad faith toward Taylor, or that
there was "any pattern of neglect by the local United States Attor-
ney."'  The Court stated that such findings "would clearly have al-
tered the balance" in favor of dismissal with prejudice.8 2 The Court
noted that a large part of the delay in Taylor, however, was appar-
ently the result of a simple "misunderstanding" as to whose duty it
was to transport Taylor before the California charges were dis-
missed.83 In the Court's opinion, as an "isolated unwitting viola-
tion," the government's conduct was not significant in terms of the
Act's balancing test.8 4
Instead, the majority regarded Taylor's failure to appear at trial
as a key factor in its decision to dismiss the case without prejudice.8 5
Indeed, stated the Court, "it was respondent, not the prosecution,
who prevented the trial from going forward in a timely fashion."8 6
The Court determined that the district court and Ninth Circuit ma-
jority had erred in failing to take Taylor's "culpable conduct" and
responsibility for the delay into account in weighing the balancing
test factors.8 7
The Court briefly discussed the possibility, raised in oral argu-
ment, that the district court might have given Taylor a harsher sen-
tence than it normally would have on the failure to appear charge in
order to "wrap up the 'equities' in a single package."88 While the
district judge gave Taylor a five-year sentence on the failure to ap-
pear charge, noted the Court, she had given his original co-defend-
ant a three-year sentence for the same narcotics offenses with which
Taylor had been charged. 9 It had been suggested in oral argument
79 Id. at 2420-21, 2423.
80 Id. at 2420.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 2421.
83 Id. at n.10 (citing United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Poole, J., dissenting), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988)).




88 Id. at 2420 n.9.
89 Id. at 2420.
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that the district court may have justified its misapplication of the Act
with the rationale that the "errors would balance out in the end." 90
The Court did not find evidence indicating that the district
court had in fact done this. 9 ' Nevertheless, it condemned the idea
that a court, in misapplying the Act as a means of ensuring future
governmental compliance, would violate a defendant's rights by im-
posing a heavy sentence on the basis of still "untested and unsub-
stantiated" facts related to the narcotics charges. 92
The Court then considered the fact that the total delay of four-
teen days caused by the government's conduct was relatively brief,
and that Taylor was not prejudiced by it.93 In the Court's view, the
district court erred in neglecting to take this into account as a factor
in the balancing test.94 Not only was the delay brief, said the Court,
but since Taylor was detained on the bench warrant as well as the
narcotics charges, there were no "additional restrictions or burdens
on his liberty as a result of the... violation." 95 Further, concluded
the Court, there was no indication that the preparation of Taylor's
defense was in any way hindered by the delay.96
With respect to the final factor specified in the Act, the impact
of the decision on the administration of the Act and justice, the
Court agreed with the district court that "dismissal with prejudice
always sends a stronger message [to the government] than dismissal
without prejudice, and is more likely to induce salutary changes in
procedures, reducing pretrial delays."'97 The Court, however, re-
jected the notion that dismissal with prejudice should serve as the
presumptive remedy for violations of the Act.98 The Court held that
the district court had erred in basing its decision principally on its
desire to avoid "tacitly condon[ing]" the government's behavior
and to send a strong message to encourage it to comply with the
Act.99
90 Id. at n.9.
91 Id. at 2420 and n.9.
92 Id. at n.9.
93 Id. at 2421-22.
94 Id. at 2423.
95 Id. at 2422. Because delay is "closely related to the issue of prejudice to the de-
fendant," the Court believed that this factor should figure into the balancing test. Id. at
2421. In support of this conclusion, the Court cited Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 537
(1972)(White, J., concurring), quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320
(1970)(emphasizing that the longer the delay, the more the defendant is likely to be
prejudiced by it).
96 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2422.
97 Id. (citing Brief for the United States at 31).
98 Id. at 2418.
99 Id. at 2422.
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In response to the contention that dismissing cases without
prejudice is a mere "toothless sanction," the Court pointed out that
the government may find reprosecution too burdensome to pursuei
or barred by the statute of limitations. 00 The Court also advocated
the "liberal use of direct sanctions" that the Act provides to "send a
message" when warranted. 10 ' The Court indicated that "dilatory"
counsel may be penalized through fines,' 02 suspension from prac-
tice, 10 3 or the reporting of the violation to disciplinary commit-
tees. 10 4 The majority stressed that the goal of deterring the
government from violating the Act should not be the determinative
factor in a court's decision to dismiss a case with prejudice.' 0 5 In-
deed, stated Justice Blackmun, "[i]f the greater deterrent effect of
barring reprosecution could alone support a decision to dismiss
with prejudice, the consideration of the other factors identified in
§ 3162(a)(2) would be superfluous, and all violations would warrant
barring reprosecution."' 106
The Court concluded that, in the absence of a thorough expla-
nation by the district court as to how it assessed each factor in the
balancing test, it could only infer that the district court had dis-
missed the case with prejudice solely to send a strong message to
the government.' 0 7 In the Court's opinion, heavy reliance on this
one factor, common to all Speedy Trial Act cases, could not support
a decision to dismiss a case with prejudice, and was reversible
error. 1
0 8
B. JUSTICE WHITE, CONCURRING
Justice White filed a short concurrence. 109 He agreed with the
majority that "when a defendant, through deliberate misconduct, in-
terferes with compliance with the Speedy Trial Act and a violation of
100 Id.
101 Id. at n.14.
102 Id. § 3162(b)(C) provides that if the government's attorney knowingly and will-
fully causes an improper delay in trial, he may be fined in an amount not to exceed $250.
18 U.S.C. § 3162(b)(C) (1982).
103 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2422 n.14. § 3162(b)(D) provides that such attorney may be
denied "the right to practice before the court considering such case for a period of not
to exceed ninety days." 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b)(D) (1982).
104 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2422 n.14. § 3162(b)(E) provides that the court may disci-
pline such attorney "by filing a report with an appropriate disciplinary committee."
Note, however, that this argument is inapplicable in Taylor, in which the USMS, not the
prosecuting attorney, occasioned the delay. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b)(E) (1982).
105 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2423.
106 Id. at 2422.
107 Id. at 2423.
108 Id.
109 Id. (White, J., concurring).
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the Act then occurs," the case should not be dismissed with preju-
dice unless the violation of the Act is "much more serious" than in
Taylor."t0 Justice White thus emphasized the point that a defend-
ant's contribution to the delay should weigh heavily against dismis-
sals with prejudice."'
C. JUSTICE SCALIA, CONCURRING IN PART
Justice Scalia agreed with the result reached by the majority,
and that the issue of prejudice to the defendant must be taken into
account in applying the balancing test. However, he opposed the
majority's reliance on legislative history when the statute of the lan-
guage was, as he thought, clear."i 2 He indicated that the majority
had reviewed the Act's legislative history to establish that prejudice
to the defendant is one of the factors to which the phrase "among
others" refers.1 3 Justice Scalia believed that this point was "so ut-
terly clear from the text" of the Act that the majority's recourse to
legislative history was unjustified." 14
Justice Scalia reasoned that it is dangerous to rely on state-
ments made during the legislative process when Congress ultimately
voted for an unambiguous act."15 To do so, he said, could distort
Congress' clear intent."16 Justice Scalia recognized that in Taylor,
the Court would have reached the same result whether the legisla-
tive history was considered or not, for the issue of prejudice was not
dispositive in the majority's decision." 17 Yet, Justice Scalia argued
that the majority had set a faulty precedent."t8 According to Justice
10 Id. (White, J., concurring).
111 Id. (White, J., concurring). Justice White, however, did not indicate what type of
government conduct would have been sufficiently "serious" to warrant dismissal with
prejudice.
112 Id. at 2423 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
113 Id. (Scalia,J., concurring in part). See supra note 64 and accompanying text for the
majority's position.
114 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2423 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Note, however, that the
majority did:
not agree that the statutory text render[ed] it 'so obviou[s]' ... that the presence or
absence of prejudice to the defendant is one of the 'other factors' that a district
court is required by the Speedy Trial Act to consider. A brief review of the [House]
floor debate... demonstrate[d] that at least some Members of Congress were un-
certain about, and repeatedly sought clarification of, precisely what they were voting
for.
Id. at 2418 n.7 (citation omitted).
115 Id. at 2424 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
116 Id. at 2423-24 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
117 Id. at 2424 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
118 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice Scalia drew attention to Representative
Dennis, who stated on the House floor, "I have an amendment [specifying prejudice as a
factor] here in my hand which could be offered, but if we can make up some legislative
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Scalia, resorting to the legislative history when the statutory text is
ambiguous could jeopardize the democratic process if done to argue
in favor of elements that were in fact intentionally omitted from the
language of statutes later securing congressional and presidential
approval."19
D. THE DISSENT
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote
a lengthy dissent, arguing that the majority's fuling wrongly de-
prived the district judge of the discretion that the Act had granted to
her.1 20 The dissent stressed that the Act expressly granted district
judges this discretion because they are in a "much better position"
than appellate judges to assess the circumstances surrounding cases
and to determine how those cases should properly be dismissed.' 2 '
District judges, said Justice Stevens, have a unique
understanding, not only of what actually happened, but also of the sig-
nificance of certain events .... Moreover, the trial judge is privy to
certain information ... such as her impression of the demeanor and
attitude of the parties, her intentions in handling the future course of
the proceedings, and her understanding of how the limited issue faced
on appeal fits within the larger factual and procedural context. 122
The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's failure to at-
tach importance to the fact that the district judge gave Taylor a five-
year sentence on the failure to appear charge, while Taylor's origi-
nal co-defendant was given only a three-year sentence on the nar-
cotics charges.' 23 Indeed, Justice Stevens believed that it would
have been proper to take the dismissed narcotics charges into ac-
count in imposing a harsh sentence on Taylor for his failure to ap-
pear. ' 24 The dissent noted that the statute under which Taylor was
sentenced for failure to appear' 25 defined two classes of violations:
(i) failure to appear to face felony charges, punishable by a maxi-
mum of five years imprisonment, and (ii) failure to appear to face
misdemeanor charges, punishable by a maximum of one year im-
prisonment. 126 The dissent reasoned that because the failure to ap-
history which would do the same thing, I am willing to do it." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring
in part)(quoting 120 CONG. REc. 41795 (1974)).
119 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in parl).
120 Id. at 2428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 2424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 2424-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
123 Id. at 2425 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
124 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1982) (repealed).
126 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2425 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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pear statute itself differentiated between these two classes of
accused persons-although the defendant, when sentenced, has not
been convicted of the crime in question and therefore remains
under a presumption of innocence with regard to it-it was proper
to take the pending charges into account in sentencing.' 27
The dissent also contested the majority's conclusion that the
district court had failed to offer any basis on which to characterize
the government's conduct as "lackadaisical."' 128  The dissent
pointed out that the district court had taken note of the USMS' fail-
ure to promptly comply with a court order to transport Taylor, a
"serious matter."' 29 Indeed, said the dissent, the district judge had
listed all instances of inexcludable delay and indicated that the gov-
ernment lacked a valid excuse for each of them. 130 Injustice Ste-
vens' opinion, the district court had studied and carefully weighed
every factor in the balancing test, and reached a "sensible"
conclusion. '31
Justice Stevens stated that had he been confronted with the case
as a district judge, he was not certain how he would have dismissed
it.132 He stated that he would have assumed, however, that if he had
"set forth a sensible explanation" for his holding, it would have
withstood appellate review.' 33 He added that dismissing the case
without prejudice would be a "rather meaningless sanction" unless
the statute of limitations had run, in which case it would not matter
how the case was dismissed.' 34 Justice Stevens was concerned that
the majority's holding would encourage district courts to consist-
ently dismiss cases without prejudice in order to avoid reversal on
appeal.' 35 This, he concluded, would run contrary to the spirit of
the Act and deprive district courts of the discretion to which the Act
properly entitles them.136
IV. ANALYSIS
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was designed to promote greater
efficiency in processing criminal cases in order to achieve two goals.
The first was to establish a standard by which the sixth amendment
127 Id. at 2425-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 2626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 2427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 2426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 2626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 2426, 2428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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right to a speedy trial 3 7 could be more effectively and uniformly
implemented than had been possible under either judicially created
balancing tests or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.138 Sec-
ond, the Act sought to respond to a national concern with increas-
ing crime, which many attributed in part to offenses committed by
criminal defendants who spent extended periods of time free on bail
while awaiting trial.139
The dismissal sanction, which the Supreme Court addressed for
the first time in Taylor, proved controversial from the start. Indeed,
commentators and courts have raised persuasive counterarguments
in response to several of the interpretations that the Court adopted
for the balancing test factors. Nevertheless, Taylor is valuable as a
guiding framework for courts applying the dismissal sanction, thus
achieving a major purpose of the Act by furthering uniformity
among decisions.
Moreover, Taylor serves as a signal to courts that the Act seeks
to address the public interest in crime control as well as the defend-
ant's sixth amendment rights, and that these factors cannot be ne-
glected when the balancing test factors are interpreted and weighed.
The balancing test factors in the Act implicitly respond to the com-
peting interests of protecting the defendant's right to a speedy trial
and society's interest in controlling crime. Courts must therefore
take both of these purposes into account in deciding whether to dis-
miss cases with or without prejudice under the Act.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE DISMISSAL SANCTION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The concern for promptly disposing of criminal cases did not
begin with the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. For quite some time, con-
gressional bills had sought to clarify defendants' interest in, and
right to, a speedy trial. 140 In the late 1960's, however, speedy trial
legislation assumed an added dimension. Speedy trial guarantees
came to be seen as a means of responding to the growing national
137 The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The Supreme Court has held this right to be "as fundamental as any of the
rights secured by the Sixth Amendment." Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223
(1967).
138 See Steinberg, Right to a Speedy Trial The Constitutional Right and Its Applicability to the
Speedy TrialAct of 1974, 66J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 229, 230 (1975)(citing H.R. REP.
No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7404-05).
139 Steinberg, supra note 138, at 930 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
15-16, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7408-09).
140 A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 65, at 11.
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problem of increasing crime. Society's interest in speedy trial guar-
antees was thus recognized.' 41
The "enormous increase in the rate of crime"' 42 was believed
to have been exascerbated by the Bail Reform Act of 1966,' 4 which
permitted defendants in non-capital cases to be liberally released
before trial without having to post the conventional bail bond.' 44
The Court has advanced that "the longer an accused is free awaiting
trial, the more tempting becomes his opportunity to jump bail and
escape." 45
The Bail Reform Act was also perceived as a vehicle by which
defendants released on bond could "exert[] heavy pressure" on
their lawyers to postpone trials as long as possible in the hope that
the government's case would be weakened or dropped in the inter-
val.' 46 This factor contributed to an enormous backlog in the fed-
eral courts.' 47
This problem was also believed to be aggravated by the Crimi-
nal justice Act of 1964.148 The Act, which guaranteed indigent de-
141 Id.
142 Burger, The State of the Judiciary--1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 930 (1970).
'43 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1982).
144 Burger, supra note 142, at 930. The Supreme Court had also pointed out that
"[i]n Washington, D.C., in 1968, 70.1% of the persons arrested for robbery and re-
leased prior to trial were re-arrested while on bail." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519
n.8 (1972), (citing Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA.
L. REV. 1223, 1236 (1969)(citation omitted)). The legislative history, discussing the
benefits of speedy trials to society, referred to a government study on recidivism which
concluded, based on data gathered in 1968, that there was "(a) [a]n increased propen-
sity to be re-arrested when released more than 280 days; and (b) an increased propensity
of persons classified as dangerous ... to be re-arrested in the period from 24 to 8 weeks
prior to trial." H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7408-09. See also Note, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Defining the
Sixth Amendment Right, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 130, 133 n.15. The HouseJudiciary Commit-
tee also noted that by 1974, approximately 75% of all defendants were released pending
trial, which "means that persons who are likely to commit additional crimes could with-
out adequate supervision ... continue to reap the profits of criminal activity at the ex-
pense of the public." H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7409.
145 Barker, 407 U.S. at 520. The Court cited the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 321 (1971) for the proposi-
tion that such offenses had been increasing in number.
146 Burger, supra note 142, at 931. Chief Justice Burger stated that "[d]efendants,
whether guilty or innocent, are human: They love freedom and hate punishment... We
should not be surprised that a defendant on bail exerts a heavy pressure on his court-
appointed lawyer to postpone the trial as long as possible so as to remain free." Id.
147 In Barker, the Court stated that the "large backlog of cases in urban courts ...
enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and
otherwise manipulate the system." Barker, 407 U.S. at 519 (citing REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 256 (1966)).
148 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982).
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fendants an attorney at public expense and removed their monetary
concerns, was thought to discourage defendants from disposing of
their cases as quickly as they could by avoiding continuances and
pleading guilty.' 49
Despite the increase in crime and the corresponding backlog in
the federal courts, it was acknowledged that the "revolution in crim-
inal justice" had secured gains for defendants that were important
to preserve.150 Speedy trial legislation arose as a means of decreas-
ing the number of criminal defendants who were free on bail and
alleviating congestion in the federal courts in a manner that would
not contradict the goals of the Bail Reform and Criminal Justice
Acts. 151
At the same time, there was a concern that defendants' rights to
a speedy trial under the sixth amendment were inadequately pro-
tected under the extant standards.' 52 Before 1972 and the decision
in Barker v. Wingo,153 the Supreme Court had never attempted to
establish uniform standards for the implementation of the sixth
amendment speedy trial guarantee. 154
The Barker Court recognized that "It]he right to a speedy trial is
generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the
Constitution for the protection of the accused," because in addition
to the defendant's interest in being treated fairly, "there is a societal
interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and
at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused."' 55 With
both these interests in mind, the Court adopted a balancing test to
determine whether a defendant had been deprived of his sixth
amendment right. 156 The Court identified four factors that must be
149 Burger, supra note 142, at 930-3 1. According to Chief Justice Burger, "[a]s re-
cently as 1950, three or four judges wvere able to handle all serious criminal cases [in
Washington, D.C.]. By 1968, twelve judges out of fifteen in active service were assigned
to the criminal calendar and could barely keep up." Id. at 931. He also stated:
[w]e should not be surprised at delay when more and more defendants demand
their undoubted constitutional right to a trial by jury because we have provided
them with lawyers and other needs at public expense; nor should we be surprised
that most convicted persons seek a new trial when the appeal costs them nothing
and when failure to take the appeal will cost them freedom.
Id.
150 Id. at 931.
151 See generally A. PATRIDGE, supra note 65, at 13.
152 H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 7404-05.
153 407 U.S. 514 (1972)(setting forth a balancing test for the determination of
whether a defendant's sixth amendment speedy trial rights had been violated).
154 See Steinberg, supra note 138, at 230 & n.21.
155 Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.
156 Id. at 530.
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considered: "[1]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defend-
ant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." 157
Although the Court was aware of requests for more explicit stan-
dards, it found "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy
trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or
months."'' 58 Moreover, quantifying the speedy trial right would
have required the Court to engage in "legislative or rulemaking ac-
tivity," which, the Court said, was beyond its authority. 159
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure went no further in
satisfying proponents of more definite speedy trial standards. 160
Rule 50(b) provides that "each district court shall conduct a contin-
uing study of the administration of criminal justice . . . and shall
prepare plans for the prompt disposition of criminal cases."' 161 Ad-
vocates of more specific standards believed, however, that "plans
submitted under the rule had failed to provide a uniform definition
of speedy trial and had only encouraged perpetuation of the status
quo."' 162 Rule 48(b) provides that "[i]f there is unnecessary delay in
presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information...
or . . . in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the
indictment, information or complaint."' 163 Since courts had inter-
preted this rule in an "erratic way," it similarly provided little defini-
tive guidance. 164 Indeed, "in passing the Speedy Trial Act,
Congress specifically determined that neither the previous decisions
of the Supreme Court nor the implementation of rule 50(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had provided the courts with
adequate guidance on the speedy trial question."' 165
The concern with the need to address both growing crime and
inadequate sixth amendment protections for criminal defendants
was shared by the American Bar Association, which developed the
Standards Related to Speedy Trial. 166 The standards sought to en-
157 Id.
158 Id. at 523.
159 Id.
160 For discussions of the inadequacies of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the Barker balancing test as a means of furthering speedy trials, see Note, supra note
144, at 141-44 and Note, Criminal Law-Federal System Adopts Specific Parameters for the Con-
stitutional Right to a Speedy Trial-Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 449, 450
(1976) [hereinafter Specific Parameters].
161 FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b).
162 Note, supra note 144, at 141-42.
163 FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
164 Note, supra note 144, at 143.
165 Steinberg, supra note 138, at 230 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7404-05).
166 A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (Approved Draft, 1968).
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sure: (1) the defendant's personal interest in a speedy trial, includ-
ing the preservation of the means of presenting his or her defense,
avoiding long periods of incarceration before trial or conditional re-
lease, and long periods of "anxiety and public suspicion arising out
of the accusation"; and (2) the public's interest in "proving the
charge" and avoiding "an extended period of pretrial freedom by
the defendant during which time he may flee, commit other crimes,
or intimidate witnesses."1 67 The standards provided only for dis-
missals with prejudice. 168
The first congressional bill advocating the speedy trial as a re-
sponse to increasing crime was the Pretrial Crime Reduction Act,
introduced by Representative Abner Mikva in November, 1969.169
This bill, based in large part on the American Bar Association Stan-
dards, similarly provided exclusively for dismissals with preju-
dice.' 70 It also provided for a sixty day period during which
defendants charged with violent crimes could be brought to trial,
and a 120 day period for those charged with other offenses.,' Its
principal aim was to" 'avoid[] the repugnant, and probably uncon-
stitutional, alternative of preventive detention'" that the Nixon ad-
ministration favored as a means of reducing the number of crimes
committed by defendants released on bail.' 72 A number of bills had
previously been introduced which would have permitted such deten-
tion in the case of defendants charged with "dangerous" crimes. 17
A "Speedy Trial Act" bill was introduced into the Senate in
June, 1970, by Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., a key sponsor of the Bail Re-
form Act of 1966 and an opponent of preventive detention. 174 Sen-
ator Ervin's bill, like Representative Mikva's, was offered as an
alternative to preventive detention, and stressed both crime reduc-
tion and sixth amendment rights. Senator Ervin's original bill pro-
vided for dismissals with prejudice except in cases where the delay
was due to the fault of the defendant or defense counsel.' 75
Neither the Mikva nor the original Ervin bill survived, but the
167 Id. at Commentary to § 1.1, reprinted in A. PARTRIDGE, sUPRA note 65, at 12.
168 A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 4.1.
169 115 CONG. REC. 34334-36 (1969).
170 See id. at 34336.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 34335. The Barker court also voiced its opposition to pretrial detention,
stating that it "contributes to the overcrowding and generally deplorable state of [local
jails]"; jeopardizes the chances of successful rehabilitation; may lead to violent rioting;
and is very costly. Barker, 407 U.S. at 520-21.
173 A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 65, at 13.
174 S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 3405-09 (1971).
175 See 117 CONG. REC. at 3409.
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Ervin bill was reintroduced in 1973.176 The 1972 Senate subcom-
mittee bill omitted the reference to "fault" and barred the re-
prosecution of any offenses "based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode" as the dismissed offense. 177 This
sanction met harsh criticism from both members of Congress and
the Department of Justice.178
By 1974, the Senate had agreed to compromise; its committee
bill that year provided for dismissal without prejudice.1 79 Prosecu-
tion, however, could "only be reinstituted if the court ... finds...
compelling evidence that the delay was caused by exceptional cir-
cumstances which the government and the court could not have
foreseen or avoided."' 80 Senator Ervin himself admitted that even
within the Senate, opposition to the provision allowing only dismis-
sals with prejudice was so intense that it would have made passage
of the bill impossible.1 8' The 1974 House subcommittee bill, how-
ever, provided only for dismissal with prejudice.' 82
The Department of Justice reiterated its dissatisfaction, and fi-
nally indicated that it would support the bill if it provided the dis-
trict court with the discretion to dismiss cases either with or without
prejudice.1 83 Congress ultimately acknowledged that the President
would likely use a pocket veto to prevent the bill's passage unless
Congress compromised with the Department of Justice. 84 Repre-
sentative Cohen thus hurriedly introduced a bill incorporating the
current version of the dismissal sanction.' 85 This compromise bill,
amended on the floor of the House, passed both houses of Con-
gress' 86 and was signed into law by President Ford on January 3,
176 S. 754, 93 Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 3263-68 (1973).
177 Id. at 3265.
178 In the Department's view, the
mandatory dismissal of criminal cases can only serve to injure the public by releas-
ing persons charged with crime .... This injures the public not only because the
person may pose a danger to the public welfare, but also because it undermines the
public's confidence in the criminal justice system to see persons charged with crime
released without trial.
Letter from Elliot L. Richardson to Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (Oct. 11, 1973), reprinted in
Hansen & Reed, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 in Constitutional Perspective, 47 Miss. LJ. 365,
415 (1976)(footnote omitted).
179 S. 754, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 24668 (1974).
180 Id.
181 See Hansen & Reed, supra note 178, at 415.
182 H.R. 17409, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 41783 (1974).
183 Letter from Attorney General William B. Saxbe to Rep. Peter W. Rodino,Jr. (Dec.
13, 1974), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 41619-20 (1974). See A. PARTRIDGE, Supra note
65, at 16-18.
184 A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 65, at 17-18.
185 H.R. 17409, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 41793-94 (1974).
186 See United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2418 (1988).
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1975.187 The dismissal sanction ultimately went, into effect on July
1, 1980.18
Because the current version of the dismissal sanction, which in-
cludes the balancing test factors, was hurriedly amended and
passed, it had "no antecedents in earlier versions of the bill, and no
substantial guidance [was] to be found in the history made on the
House floor."18 9 It is not surprising, therefore, that courts inter-
preted the balancing test factors with little or no more consistency
than they had under the Barker doctrine or the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 90 Taylor, by providing a framework in which
cases arising under the dismissal sanction might be more uniformly
decided by the courts, furthers a primary goal of the Act.
B. THE BALANCING TEST FACTORS
Before Taylor, some controversy had existed among the district
courts and circuit courts of appeals as to how to interpret the bal-
ancing test factors identified, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the
dismissal sanction.19 1 Commentators have repeatedly termed the
dismissal sanction "unclear"' 92 and "ambiguous."'19 3 To some ex-
tent, the degree to which courts had given adequate consideration
to the dual aims of the Act, crime control and the effective imple-
mentation of the sixth amendment speedy trial right, determined
their interpretation of the balancing test factors. This section will
explore the various interpretations courts have given to the balanc-
187 A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 65, at 18.
188 18 U.S.C. § 3163(c) (1982).
189 A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 65, at 33.
190 This is not to imply that the Speedy Trial Act precludes review under a strict sixth
amendment analysis pursuant to the Barker balancing test. § 3173 of the Act explicitly
states that "[n]o provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of
denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3173 (1982). For example, if a defendant can prove that he was severely prejudiced by
a delay shorter than the time limits specified in the Act, he could conceivably assert a
successful claim based on the sixth amendment. See 120 CONG. REC. 41777 (1974) (ex-
change between Rep. Wiggins and Rep. Cohen), reprinted in A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 65,
at 258. Because outcomes under the Barker analysis and the Speedy Trial Act may vary,
commentators have urged defense counsel to seek dismissal under both theories. See
Russ & Mandelkern, The Speedy TrialAct of 1974: A Trap for the Unwary Practitioner, 2 NAT'L
J. CRIM. DEF. 1, 32 (1976).
191 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
192 La Fave and Israel stated that the" 'with or without prejudice' provision, the result
of an amendment on the floor of the House, is not only anticlimatic [sic] [in view of the
years of effort that went into developing a uniform, definitive remedy] but also very
unclear." W. LA FAvE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.3, at 694 (1985) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982)).
193 Note, Specific Parameters, supra note 160, at 457 n.53.
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ing test factors and address the arguments advanced in favor of
each.
1. The Seriousness of the Offense
The seriousness of the offense committed has in and of itself
not proved to be a controversial factor among courts applying the
dismissal sanction of the Act. The courts are in general agreement
as to which offenses should be termed "serious" for purposes of the
Act. 194 The Supreme Court in Taylor agreed with the district court
and Ninth Circuit that Taylor's alleged offenses, conspiracy to pos-
sess cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
were "serious" crimes. 195 Courts have uniformly termed narcotics
offenses "serious" in discussing this factor. 196 In almost all cases
involving narcotics, courts have held the gravity of the offense to be
a significant factor leading them to determine that the case should
be dismissed without prejudice. 197
Although not articulated by the Supreme Court in Taylor, which
examined this factor on its own merits, many courts have weighed
the seriousness of the defendant's offense against that of the Speedy
194 See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
195 United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2420 (1988).
196 See United States v. May, 819 F.2d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 1987)(five counts of posses-
sion with intent to distribute controlled substances); United States v. Stayton, 791 F.2d
17, 21 (2d Cir. 1986)(trafficking in 200 kg. of phenylacetone to be used in
methamphetamine manufacture); United States v. Simmons, 786 F.2d 479, 485 (2d Cir.
1986)(several counts involving a "relatively small quantity" of substances); United
States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 1454, 1456 (11 th Cir. 1985)(several offenses involving mari-
juana importation); United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 244 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986)(distribution and conspiracy to distribute four ounces of
cocaine with a wholesale value of $10,000); United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267
(11 th Cir. 1984)(several offenses involving methaqualone); United States v. Carreon,
626 F.2d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 1980)(one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and
seven counts of heroin distribution); United States v. Veillette, 654 F.Supp. 1260, 1263
(D. Me. 1987)(possession of 280 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute); United
States v. Green, 582 F. Supp. 265, 267 (D. Colo. 1984)(one count of distribution of a
schedule II drug); United States v. Angelini, 553 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D.Mass.), vacated and
remanded, 678 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1982)(possession and distribution of methaqualone was
"serious," but the factor was "neutral" because the government's proof was predicated
only on fragments of seven Quaalude tablets valued at approximately $4).
197 But see Stayton, 791 F.2d at 21 (the court held that a delay of 23 months between
voir dire and the swearing of the jury outweighed the seriousness of the offense); Russo,
741 F.2d at 1267-68 (a delay of several months in bringing the defendant to trial out-
weighed the seriousness of the offense); United States v. laquinta, 515 F. Supp. 708, 710
(N.D.W. Va. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 674 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1982) (Neither mention-
ing the Act's crime reduction rationale nor explaining the balancing test factors, the
court dismissed the case with prejudice, stating that the Act was "designed to implement
and enforce the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and to ensure uniformity of the
same throughout the nation.").
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Trial Act violation.1 98 When a court has deemed a crime "not seri-
ous," cases have consistently resulted in dismissals with
prejudice.1 99
It is noteworthy that the Court did not articulate a standard that
a number of courts have used to assess the seriousness of the of-
fense: that the length of the sentence for an offense is a valid indica-
tion of its gravity.20 0 One commentator has cautioned against such
practices, stating that "inconsistency on the legislature's part be-
tween length of the sentence and severity of the crime has been
aptly demonstrated. " 20 1 The Court, in holding that a narcotics of-
fense was serious, implicitly rejected another standard for measur-
ing the gravity of the offense: whether it was "violent. ' 20 2 Indeed,
"non-violent crimes, particularly those that have massive social im-
198 See, e.g., May, 819 F.2d at 534 (dismissal without prejudice); Russo, 741 F.2d at
1267 (dismissal with prejudice); Carreon, 626 F.2d at 533 (dismissal without prejudice).
199 Other cases involving "serious" offenses include: United States v. Fountain, 840
F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 533 (1988) (being an accomplice to mur-
der); United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (8th Cir. 1987) (bank record
fraud amounting to almost one million dollars); United States v. Peeples, 811 F.2d 849,
851 (5th Cir. 1987)(attempt to defraud an investor of more than $500,000); United
States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964
(1986) (transporting illegal aliens); United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir.
1983)(possession of unregistered guns); United States v. Hawthorne, 705 F.2d 258, 260
(7th Cir. 1983)(possession of stolen government checks); Veillette, 654 F. Supp. at 1262
(possession of unregistered firearm silencer); Green, 582 F. Supp. at 265 (illegally selling
food stamps worth $2,500).
Offenses that courts have not deemed sufficiently serious for purposes of the Act
include: mail theft of a ring, United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir.
1983); mail theft of a check, United States v. Jervey, 630 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); and credit card fraud amounting to $1,000, United States v. Koch, 438 F. Supp.
307, 310 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 563 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 736 U.S. 946, aft'd, 598 F.2d
610 (2d Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Bilotta, 645 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 835 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1987), in which the court stated that if conspiracy to export
military and espionage equipment to Libya and the U.S.S.R. was in fact "serious," the
government would not have waited 18 months to indict the defendant. Id. at 373. What
the court likely meant was that it did not consider the offense as serious as the govern-
ment's violation of the Act, a standard used by many courts in assessing the seriousness
of the offense. See supra note 198 for courts articulating this standard.
200 See, e.g., Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d at 1268 (in which the Court stated that "as an
objective measure, possible imprisonment for fifty-five years is some indication that the
offense is serious.").
201 Steinberg, Dismissal With or W1ithout Prejudice Under the Speedy Trial Act: A Proposed
Interpretation, 68J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9 n.79 (1977) (referring to a former Cali-
fornia statute that set the sentence for second indecent exposure conviction at one year
to life).
202 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2420. See Caparella, 716 F.2d at 980 ("absent exascerbating
circumstances such as violence," postal theft was not a serious crime); Jervey, 630 F.
Supp. at 698 (citing Caparella in a case involving postal theft). Nine years earlier, how-
ever, the same judge that decidedJervey had stated that if the defendant had been "the
Heroin Tycoon of the East Bronx," he might have dismissed the case without prejudice.
Koch, 438 F. Supp. at 310. This indicates that these courts would perhaps have been
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plications, also may be considered serious in nature," for example, a
corporate executive "criminally polluting public waters." 203
2. The Facts and Circumstances Leading to the Dismissal
The second factor guiding courts in their application of the dis-
missal sanction is the facts and circumstances leading to the dismis-
sal.20 4 This factor relates to the role played by the government and,
where applicable, the defendant in causing the delay resulting in the
violation of the Act. The courts have differed significantly in inter-
preting this factor, especially in theirjudgments as to what types of
government conduct should be factored into the balancing test.
a. The Nature of the Government's Violation of the Act
The Taylor majority stated that "a truly neglectful attitude on
the part of the government reasonably could be factored against it"
in the balancing test.20 5 Such an attitude might have been demon-
strated by a "pattern of neglect by the local United States Attorney"
or by evidence of "bad faith."' 20 6 As the Taylor case demonstrates,
however, "bad faith" is in many respects a subjective standard that
courts can interpret differently. Justice Stevens, for example, stated
that the "characterization of such a violation as 'lackadaisical' ap-
pears understated," implying that he believed the USMS to have ac-
ted in bad faith. 20 7 In contrast, the majority held that a mere
"isolated unwitting violation" such as that in Taylor was insufficient
to tip the balance in favor of dismissal with prejudice. 208
Whether "unwitting" violations should be weighed against the
government in determining how to dismiss cases under the Act has
been controversial among the courts. Some courts have held that
negligence or inadvertence on the part of the government should
indeed be factored into the balancing test. One court, for example,
more careful about their choice of terminology if serious but non-violent narcotics of-
fenses had in fact been at issue.
203 Steinberg, supra note 201, at 9.
204 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982).
205 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2420.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 2426 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the dissent stated that "the impor-
tant issue is... whether the Service acted carelessly or without regard for respondent's
interest in seeing justice administered swiftly," it believed that this was a factual determi-
nation that only the district court was in a position to make. Id. Acting without thinking
about the defendant's interests, however, is not in bad faith in the same way that con-
sciously or maliciously trying to prejudice him to further some motive would be. The
dissent appears to adopt the former sense of bad faith, and the majority the latter. See id.
at 2420-21; id. at 2426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 2421.
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held that although the government's failure to file a timely indict-
ment "did not spring from any evil motive... when a defense mo-
tion . . . is late, the government is quick to point [that] out....
Meeting established time limitations is important and lack of atten-
tion or dilatoriness in observing them should not be encouraged by
courts viewing such neglect tolerantly." 209
Another court rejected the government's argument that "its re-
calcitrance was neither intentional, nor designed to secure any tacti-
cal advantage." 2 10  The government claimed that it had
misunderstood the implications of the new Act, and had not realized
that it had violated it when it delayed several months in bringing the
defendant to trial. 211 The court argued that "the mere lack of im-
proper motive is not a sufficient excuse," and that "[s]ome affirma-
tive justification must be demonstrated to warrant a dismissal
without prejudice" where the seriousness of the crime was balanced
by the idea that dismissals without prejudice "frustrat[e] the Act's
mandate of swift prosecution. ' 212 The court stated, however, that
"mere negligence or inadvertence" would not necessarily call for
dismissal without prejudice if, for example, the crime was very seri-
ous and the unexcused delay minimal.213
Other courts have argued the reverse, reasoning that because
unintentional, inadvertent acts resulting in violations are not deter-
rable, the sanction of dismissal with prejudice would serve no useful
purpose. 2 14 This view, however, contradicts much of the traditional
rationale behind imposing liability for negligence: that holding per-
209 United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1983).
210 United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1984).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. See also United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d, 1265, 1268 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 (1986)(stating in dicta that oversight cannot "always excuse a
failure to meet the Act's deadlines," as where the government frequently fails to comply
or has failed to comply "more than once with respect to the same defendant."); United
States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 260, 266 (9th Cir. 1976)(stating in dicta that under the Act,
"the government should be aware that negligent conduct in bringing an accused to trial
will not be tolerated.").
214 See United States v. Hawthorne, 705 F.2d 258, 261 (7th Cir. 1983)(because a cleri-
cal miscalculation, resulting in a violation, was unintentional and not designed to gain a
"tactical advantage," it should not factor in the balancing test); United States v. Bittle,
699 F.2d 1201, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1983)("the government's exceeding the time limit was
unintentional" and "unlikely to recur."); United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 533
(7th Cir. 1980)(finding no evidence that the government's failure to file a timely petition
for hearing was intentional and likely to recur); United States v. Green, 582 F. Supp.
265, 267 (D. Colo. 1984)(in which it did "not appear that the delay was intentional or
willful," but was simply "the result of inattention.").
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sons liable for careless behavior encourages them to take greater
care.
Taylor is problematic in that the "lackadaisical" conduct of the
USMS, while not stemming from an evil motive, was indeed inten-
tional and hence deterrable. The Court, however, by terming the
violation "unwitting," placed it in the same category as unconscious
clerical errors resulting in delays, a type of error that courts have
often excluded from the balancing test.2 1 5 Although it did not in-
tend to disadvantage Taylor by postponing his departure from Cali-
fornia, the USMS indeed sought to benefit, in terms of cost-
efficiency, from the delay.2 16
While the proper balancing of all the factors warrants dis-
missing Taylor without prejudice, it arguably defeats a central pur-
pose of the Act to give no consideration at all to intentional
violations, which the Act aims to prevent. Perhaps the better view is
that violations committed in good faith should be factored into the
test, but given less weight than bad faith violations. This could
make a difference in the outcome of cases on the margin, for exam-
ple, in which the offense involved is less serious than Taylor's.
Taylor leaves unanswered the question of how to address situa-
tions in which the court itself, and not the prosecuting attorney, is
the cause of the delay.21 7 The language of the statute does not de-
lineate the range of violations that should be considered in balanc-
ing the factors, and courts are divided on the issue. Some courts
have reasoned that because court oversights are not the target of the
Act, they are not relevant.2 18 Other courts, in contrast, have drawn
215 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2421.
216 Id. at 2416. In United States v.Jervey, 630 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court
took a different approach. The court found that the government had made a good faith
attempt to transport the defendant prisoner in a timely manner, but nevertheless failed
to do so within the Act's time limits. Id. at 695. Judge Brieant
recognize[d] the reality of federal prisoner transportation. Under existing condi-
tions, three weeks for this trip [was] neither unusual nor unexpected. The prison
bus, which usually takes a circuitous route like that of a tramp steamer, need not run
through the night.... Congress did not intend that prisoners and their custodians
travel on the regularly scheduled airlines as a customary means of travel.
Id. at 697. No matter how unfeasible compliance with the Act may have been, however,
Judge Brieant held that under the Act, "[sluch ordinary institutionalized delay [was] not
an excuse," and dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at 697-98. Nonetheless, he urged
Congress to either amend the "silly" § 3161 (h) (1) (H), which excludes from speedy trial
time only ten days for the transportation of prisoners, or appropriate funds sufficient to
ensure expeditious travel. Id. at 698.
217 18 U.S.C. § 3174(a)(b) (1982) permits that the running of the "speedy trial clock"
to be suspended in the case of overcrowded court dockets, provided the chief district
judge properly petitions the judicial council of the circuit.
218 See United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1178 (8th Cir. 1987)(not weighing the
delay caused by unavailability of trial judge); United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 1454,
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no distinction between the roles of the court and the prosecutor in
causing the delay.219 These courts have reasoned that the effect on
the defendant is the same regardless of the cause of the violation.
Taylor drew no distinction between the USMS and the prosecut-
ing attorneys when it stated that if the USMS had acted in bad faith
or had been responsible for repeated violations, the balance "would
clearly have [been] altered." 220 Because the USMS is even less sub-
ject to the prosecutor's control than are court personnel, Taylor, by
implication, appears to support the view that delays resulting from
negligence in the court system should factor into the balancing test
if they are frequent or in bad faith. One commentator has agreed
that delays caused by the court's "deliberate or negligent miscon-
duct" are "impermissible" and should weigh in favor of dismissal
with prejudice.22 '
b. The Role of the Defense in Contributing to the Violation
Taylor was largely responsible for the events culminating in the
Speedy Trial Act violation. Although the dismissal was predicated
on the fact that a sufficient number of non-excludable days had
elapsed after Taylor was located and the speedy trial clock began to
run, it is also true that if not for his initial flight from Washington,
the government would have tried him within the limits imposed by
the Act. judge Poole, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit, noted the
"iron[y] that the statutory scheme which would have assured [Tay-
lor's] orderly trial in November 1984, is resorted to, five months
later, as the reason for 'springing' him to freedom and conferring
1456 (lth Cir. 1985)(government "twice filed reports alerting the trial court of the
speedy trial deadline, [but] [t]he case was simply not reached on the trial docket, a mat-
ter within the primary responsibility of the court."); United States v. Veillette, 654
F.Supp. 1260, 1264 (D. Me. 1987) (negligence on the part of trial court personnel would
be a factor, but delay caused by the Clerk of the Supreme Court or court of appeals, or
the Solicitor General's office, was not). Kramer and Phillips are difficult to reconcile with
18 U.S.C. § 3174 (a)(b) (1982), which specifies the procedures that district judges must
follow when court dockets are overcrowded. If the court is negligent in failing to abide
by these procedures, but this negligence is not weighed in the balancing test, the de-
fendant alone is burdened, and the intent of the Act is grossly contradicted.
219 See United States v. Stayton, 791 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1986)(reasoning that "'the
Act controls the conduct of the parties and the court itself during criminal pre-trial pro-
ceedings. Not only must the court police the behavior of the prosecutor and the defense
counsel, it must also police itself' " (quoting United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 429
(1st Cir. 1984)); United States v. Angelini, 553 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D. Mass.), vacated and
remanded, 678 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1982)(stating that "even if the lapse were solely the
responsibility of the court, violation of the Act and defendant's rights would be no less
clear").
220 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2421.
221 Steinberg, supra note 201, at 9.
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upon him complete absolution from further prosecution." 222 Jus-
tice White evidently deemed Taylor's conduct the most important
factor leading him to concur separately in the majority's decision to
dismiss the case without prejudice.223
One commentator has agreed that "it seems unnecessary to ig-
nore completely the defendant's responsibility for the delay, partic-
ularly where such delay is intentional and without any
justification. ' 2 24 Representative Cohen's remarks during the final
House debates demonstrate an intent to "prevent defendants from
taking advantage of their own 'deliberate stalling' to seek dismissal
under the Act." 225 Under this reasoning, the district court, Ninth
Circuit, and the dissent in Taylor were mistaken in not taking Tay-
lor's behavior into account.226
Taylor is the first reported case decided under the Act to involve
a fugitive defendant whose actions affirmatively contributed to a vio-
lation of the Act's time limits. 227 The more typical situation involves
a defendant or defense counsel who simply fails to take steps to
avoid the delay. 228 This is a virtual prerequisite for asserting a suc-
cessful sixth amendment speedy trial claim.229 The Barker Court
stressed its "reluctan[ce] ... to rule that a defendant was denied this
222 United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987)(Poole,J., dissenting),
rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 2413 (1988).
223 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2423 (White, J., concurring).
224 Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 667, 707 (1976).
225 Frase, supra note 224, at 707, citing 120 CONG. REc. 41777 (1974) (remarks of Rep.
Cohen).
226 Even the Ninth Circuit was aware of the problem of defendants becoming fugitives
shortly before the running of the speedy trial clock. United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d at
1381. The court went so far as to conclude that "the trial court may certainly take into
account the defendant's culpable absence in deciding whether any resulting dismissal
for violation of the [Act] should be with or without prejudice." Id. at 1383. Nonethe-
less, for unexplained reasons, the court did not apply this reasoning to the case before
it.
227 One such case arising under FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) resulted in dismissal with prej-
udice. The defendant in that case had escaped from jail and was charged with this of-
fense, but remained a prisoner for more than one year without being arraigned. United
States v. McLemore, 447 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
228 See United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 1983)("defendant never
manifested any desire to see the proceeding moved along any faster"); United States v.
Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1980)(defendant failed to assert his right to a
speedy trial); United States v. Veillette, 654 F. Supp. 1260, 1264 (D. Me. 1987)(the court
weighed against the defendant the fact that he had requested continuances giving rise to
excludable delays and may have had notice of the Supreme Court's denial of a certiorari
petition that restarted the speedy trial clock, where a hearing had been set for the time
such decision issued).
229 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1972). The Court "emphasize[d] that
failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that [he] was
denied a speedy trial". Id. at 532.
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constitutional right on a record that strongly indicates... that [he]
did not want a speedy trial." 230
It may well further the purposes of the Act to weigh deliberate
attempts by the defendant to stall. When one considers the third
factor of the balancing test, the impact of the decision on the admin-
istration of the Act and on justice,231 it is clear that justice would be
adversely affected if the defendant who is largely responsible for en-
gineering the delay is not penalized for his or her actions. However,
the defendant's mere failure to expedite the case, which might well
be to his or her disadvantage or stem from mere ignorance, should
not be weighed as heavily as affirmative moves for unjustifiable de-
lay. As the Barker Court noted, the "ultimate responsibility" for
government or court negligence resulting in delays "must rest with
the government," not the defendant. 232 Indeed, Barker's ruling
"place[d] the primary burden on the courts and the prosecutors to
assure that cases are brought to trial." 233
3. The Impact of the Decision on the Administration of the Act and Justice
The third factor that courts must consider in applying the dis-
missal sanction is the impact of the decision on the administration of
the Act and onjustice.234 Courts' and commentators' discussions of
this factor have focused on the general policy question of determin-
ing which remedy best responds to the aims of the Act. The argu-
ments of the courts refusing to recognize a presumption in favor of
dismissals without prejudice are self-evident, as they are motivated
by obvious concerns regarding crime control.23 5 The arguments
supporting a presumption in favor of dismissals with prejudice,
which the Supreme Court rejected in Taylor, are more complex.
Those who support a presumption in favor of dismissals with
prejudice generally focus on the interests of the defendant. Com-
mentators have reasoned that "[slince the Supreme Court has held
that the only remedy for a violation of the sixth amendment right is
dismissal with prejudice, Congress [in the Speedy Trial Act] has failed
to give adequate protection to the defendant whose right to a
230 Id. at 536.
231 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982).
232 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
233 Id. at 529.
234 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982).
235 For example, courts have weighed the "public interest in speedy trials" under this
factor, focusing on justice and the policy of the Act from the viewpoint of society.
United States v. Veillette, 654 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 (D. Me. 1987).
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speedy trial. . . has been violated. ' 23 6 It is more difficult, however,
to obtain dismissal under a sixth amendment theory than under the
Speedy Trial Act. The Barker test, for example, requires the defend-
ant to show actual prejudice and to have asserted his right to a
speedy trial. 23 7 The Act is more lenient in allowing dismissals, even
dismissals with prejudice, when these factors have not been satis-
fied. As long as the time limits imposed by the Act have been ex-
ceeded, it is mandatory for the case to be dismissed upon the
motion of the defendant. In the cases decided under the Act, de-
fendants have not generally attempted to prevail on sixth amend-
ment theories in the alternative, 23 8 which perhaps indicates a lack of
confidence in their ability to satisfy the Barker test.
Other commentators have decried the dismissal sanction as a
"serious flaw," because "[n]ot only will the defendant be subjected
to further depletion of his financial resources and curtailment of his
liberty, the process of subsequent reindictment and retrial will per-
petuate the delay condemned by the Act. ' 239 If the charge is dis-
missed without prejudice, the defendant may be rearrested or
reindicted and "the time periods of the Act would begin over again
without any compensation for the delay that had already oc-
curred." 240 Dismissals without prejudice may in fact prove more
prejudicial to the defendant than a delay in trial, for "[r]eindictment
may necessitate retaining new counsel and duplication of legal and
investigative efforts, all at increased monetary and psychological
cost to the defendant." 241
It has also been argued that permitting cases to be dismissed
and reopened not only defeats the purpose of the Act by creating
further delay, but provides no incentive for government attorneys to
indict and try cases within the time limits. 24 2 Moreover, "the need
to reindict large numbers of defendants would significantly add to
the workload and expense of the grand jury system," a concern that
236 Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 190, at 27. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S.
434, 440 (1973).
237 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
238 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988).
239 Hansen & Reed, supra note 178, at 416.
240 Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 190, at 27. This concern has motivated some
courts to state that violations of the Act should be weighed heavily against the govern-
ment if they occur "more than once with respect to the same defendant." United States
v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 (1986).
241 Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 190, at 27-28.
242 Id. at 27. On the other hand, if a defendant knows that his or her case could be
dismissed without prejudice, there would be an incentive to avoid deliberately stalling
and perpetuating delay, a significant concern of the Act's sponsors, and to play his or
her part in seeing that the proceeding moves on schedule.
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at one point prompted the House Judiciary Committee to restore
the mandatory dismissal with prejudice sanction. 245
A minority of courts have joined these commentators in criticiz-
ing the concept of dismissal without prejudice as an ineffective sanc-
tion. One court cited the legislative history of the 1979
Amendments to the Act, which postponed the effective date of the
dismissal sanction until 1980, for the proposition that "[w]hile the
act does permit dismissal without prejudice, extensive use of this
procedure could undermine the effectiveness of the act and preju-
dice defendants, and the committee intends and expects that use of
the dismissal without prejudice will be the exception and not the
rule."'244 The court believed that "[a]ny other position would
render the Act self-contradictory. A defendant would find it more
advantageous if an indictment were not dismissed ... than if the
indictment were dismissed without prejudice, thus granting the gov-
ernment a reprieve of the full statutory time limit, should it decide
to reindict. ' '245
The courts, however, have largely rejected this reasoning. The
majority of courts are in general agreement with Taylor and reason
that because the Act was the result of compromise with the Depart-
ment ofJustice, neither remedy is preferred. 246 The Taylor majority
pointed out that dismissal with prejudice is not a "toothless sanc-
tion." 247 The statute of limitations might bar reprosecution, 248 or
the government might opt against reprosecution because of the bur-
dens involved. 249 Another court has added that the grand jury may
243 Frase, supra note 224, at 708 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7430).
244 United States v. Angelini, 553 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D.Mass.), vacated and remanded,
678 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1982)(citing H.R. REP. No. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, re-
printed in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 812-13). Importantly, the 1979 House
Reports, while fully recognizing that crime control was a major force motivating the Act,
focused exclusively on procedural modifications. In this context, it becomes apparent
that the statement quoted in Angelini presupposes an optimal procedural system. As the
product of intensive examination of the substantive issues, the 1974 history is clearly
authoritative on the presumption issue.
245 Angelini, 553 F. Supp. at 370 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Iaquinta,
515 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D.W. Va. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 674 F.2d 260 (4th Cir.
1982)(erroneously tracing the legislative history no further than the A.B.A. Standards).
246 See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 979 (2d Cir. 1983).
247 United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2422 (1988).
248 See United States v. Veillette, 654 F. Supp. 1260, 1264-65 (D. Me. 1987)(one
charge barred after dismissal).
249 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2422. In contrast, Hansen & Reed, supra note 178, at 416,
contend that society's interest in safeguards against many cases being dismissed with
prejudice is sufficiently taken into account by the § 3161 (h) provisions excluding certain
periods of delay from the speedy trial clock.
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refuse to reindict, the defendant may be acquitted at trial, and the
ultimate sentence may be shorter than the one he or she would have
originally received. 250
The Court in Taylor admitted that dismissal with prejudice is the
sanction more likely to induce future compliance with the Act. 251 It
nevertheless rejected the reasoning set forth in a set of cases dis-
missed with prejudice largely in order to uphold the Act's effective-
ness.2 52 After Taylor, courts will have to take special care to explain
the basis of their decisions to dismiss cases with prejudice by care-
fully weighing the balancing test factors in order to avoid reversal.
Otherwise it may be countered that their decisions simply aimed to
provide a "meaningful" remedy for the violation.
It should be noted that it might be inaccurate to state that
neither remedy is presumptively preferred. At least for serious
crimes, there appears to be a presumption in favor of dismissals
without prejudice, which defendants can overcome only by a show-
ing that the government's violation of the Act was severe.
4. Actual Prejudice to the Defendant
The Taylor court, after reviewing the legislative history of the
Act, held that the issue of prejudice to the defendant, caused by the
delay, was intended by Congress to be one of the "other" factors
that courts must consider in deciding on a remedy for a violation of
the Speedy Trial Act. 253 The Court believed that the drafters
avoided explicit mention of this issue in the statutory text "for fear
that district courts would treat a lack of prejudice to the defendant
as dispositive." 254
Justice Scalia opposed the majority's reliance on legislative his-
250 United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 243 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1064 (1986).
251 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2422.
252 See United States v. Jervey, 630 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(it would be a
meaningless "charade" to simply dismiss the case without prejudice); United States v.
Koch, 438 F. Supp. 307, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(it would be "empty form" to dismiss with-
out prejudice and allow the prosecutor to "file a new indictment a half hour later.").
Judge Brieant, who decided both cases, however, had found that the crimes involved
were not serious. But see United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 1983)(dis-
trict court had dismissed a serious case with prejudice because the defendant might be
worse off if reindicted; Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, despite considerable
skepticism about the merits of the dismissal sanction, because to do otherwise would be
to ignore the intent of the statute). See also United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 513
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 533 (1988)(although court was "dismayed" at the con-
duct of United States Attorney's office, this was held an insufficient basis on which to
dismiss the case without prejudice).
253 108 S. Ct. at 2418.
254 Id. (citing 120 CONG. REC. 41795 (remarks of Representative Cohen)).
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tory to establish this point, stating that it was "so utterly clear from
the text" of the Act that recourse to the history was unjustified. 255
There is some merit to Justice Scalia's point that when the text of a
statute is plain, resorting to isolated statements from the legislative
history might distort Congress' ultimate intent.256 Provided that
statements from the legislative history are carefully viewed (and re-
viewed) in context, however, there is little reason to fear that the
Act's intent could be thwarted. 257
In this case, moreover, it is debatable whether the language and
intent of the Act are as obvious as Justice Scalia believed them to be.
Clearly, the majority believed otherwise. 258 For one thing, it is diffi-
cult to understand what the phrase "among othe[r]" 2 59 factors
should include without having a grasp of the background of the Act
and the purposes it aims to achieve. The legislative history is the
obvious place to turn for such guidance.
The statutory text, for example, nowhere explicitly states that
the Act was designed in part to implement the defendant's sixth
amendment speedy trial right. Only with this knowledge does it be-
come apparent that if a defendant is prejudiced, he or she should
stand a better chance of success in obtaining a dismissal with preju-
dice; for if an Act seeks to implement a constitutional requirement,
its provisions cannot fall short of it.260 When a defendant is actually
prejudiced by the delay, therefore, this factor should be weighed in
favor of dismissal with prejudice.
Courts remain, however, confronted with the issue of whether
the lack of prejudice should weigh against the defendant. Before
Taylor, courts did not uniformly agree on this issue. 261 It is conceiv-
able that courts could either (i) view the prejudice issue as weighing
both in favor of dismissal with prejudice if the defendant was
prejudiced and against it if he or she was not; or (ii) view only the
presence of prejudice as significant in terms of the balancing test,
the lack of prejudice being irrelevant. The latter view appears to
255 108 S. Ct. at 2423 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). See supra notes 112-119 and
accompanying text.
256 108 S. Ct. at 2423-24.
257 But see United States v. Angelini, 553 F. Supp. 367 (D. Mass), vacated and remanded,
678 F.2d 380 (1 st Cir. 1982) in which, improperly, only part of the legislative history was
used to illustrate a proposition.
258 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2418 n.7.
259 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982).
260 Under sixth amendment actions, actual prejudice to the defendant is a factor
weighing in favor of dismissal. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972).
261 See infra notes 262-71 and accompanying text.
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have been the understanding of the lower courts in Taylor. This rea-
soning has been set forth more explicitly:
While courts have stated that a showing of prejudice to the defendant
may be properly considered in finding that a dismissal should be with
prejudice, to interpret the defendant's failure to demonstrate preju-
dice as mandating a dismissal without prejudice overemphasizes the
probative value of this factor. The defendant's burden under the Act
is only to present proof supporting the motion for dismissal itself.26 2
The majority in Taylor, in contrast, spoke both of the "presence
or absence of prejudice to the defendant." 263 While the majority
acknowledged Representative Cohen's concern that the lack of prej-
udice should not be dispositive, it indicated that it should be taken
into account in decisions regarding the dismissal sanction. 264
Courts considering the issue of prejudice to the defendant have
examined whether the defense was impaired, 265 and the "closely re-
lated" issue of the length of delay. 2 66 The Court in Taylor expressly
held that a brief delay such as the respondent's, amounting to four-
teen days in all, should weigh in favor of dismissal without preju-
dice.267 Although no standard exists for determining whether a
delay is long or short (the Act, in a sense, presupposes that any de-
lay beyond its limits is long), a period of several months appears to
be roughly at the dividing line.268
Courts have also considered whether the defendant was free or
incarcerated during the delay.269 The Supreme Court agreed that
this was an important consideration, noting that since Taylor was
262 United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, CJ., dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
263 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2418 n.7.
264 Id. at 2418.
265 See United States v. Bilotta, 645 F. Supp. 369, 373 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d
1430 (2d Cir. 1987)(dismissed with prejudice because during the delay, tensions be-
tween the United States and Libya had intensified so much that the defendant, accused
of conspiring to sell military equipment to that country, stood a diminished chance of
having a fair trial).
266 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2421.
267 Id. at 2422.
268 See United States v. Stayton, 791 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1986)(delay of 23 months
was an -enormity"); United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 245 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986)(35-day delay "not exorbitant"); United States v. Russo, 741
F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1984)(delay of more than 70 days was an "extensive post-
ponement" [that] "certainly militate[d] toward" dismissal with prejudice); United States
v.Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 1983)(delay of two years would ordinarily present a
"strong case" for dismissal with prejudice); United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 534
(7th Cir. 1980)(delay of one year "significant" but "not extreme").
269 See, e.g., United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1987)(defendant
was free on bond for all but two weeks of a "short" several month delay); United States
v. May, 819 F.2d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 1987)(defendant was free on bail).
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already being held on the bench warrant, no "additional restrictions
or burdens on his liberty" ensued.270 Prior to Taylor, this had not
been a uniform position: some courts had deemed the question of
whether the defendant was free or imprisoned irrelevant.271 This
view finds support in the idea that delay, by its very nature, is preju-
dicial. Trial preparation can be generally hampered, as by the death
and fading memories of witnesses. 272 Moreover, "prolonged delay
may subject an accused to an emotional stress.., from uncertainties
in the prospect of facing public trial." 273 Now, however, courts will
have to view actual prejudice to the defendant more objectively.
5. Factors That Should Not Be Considered In The Balancing Test
The Taylor majority, in sharp disagreement with the dissent, be-
lieved that it would have been improper for the district court to dis-
miss the case with prejudice in order to send a strong message to
the government to comply with the Act in the future, while giving
Taylor a harsh sentence on the failure to appear charge to "wrap up
the 'equities' in a single package. ' 274 Taylor received a five-year
sentence on the failure to appear charge, while his original co-de-
fendant had received only a three-year sentence on the narcotics
charges.275 This issue had not arisen in previous cases interpreting
the dismissal sanction.
The majority's conclusion, however, is sound. It would have
indeed constituted "unbridled discretion" 276 to assume what the
outcome would have been if the respondent had been fairly tried.
The dissent correctly noted that the failure to appear statute autho-
rizes sentencing according to the severity of the offense with which
270 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2422.
271 See, e.g., Russo, 741 F.2d at 1267.
272 It may be questioned, however, whether the Act, or even the sixth amendment
itself, serves to adequately protect defendants against this harm. As the Supreme Court
has noted:
[o]n its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal
prosecution has begun .... These provisions would seem to afford no protection to
those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover,
investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). The Court noted that courts of
appeals deciding cases involving only pre-indictment delay have never reversed a con-
viction or dismissed an indictment, and declined to do so itself. Id. at 315. The defend-
ant's only safeguard against such delay is the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 315
n.8.
273 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973).
274 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2420 and n.9. There was no evidence, however, that the dis-
trictjudge had in fact done this.
275 See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
276 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2420 n.9.
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the defendant is charged. 277 Defendants in these cases have been
found guilty of failing to appear and, like Taylor, should be sen-
tenced for it. Yet, the length of the sentence should correspond to
the severity of the underlying offense, or to the circumstances of the
failure to appear, and not to the judge's guess as to the defendant's
guilt regarding the underlying offense. The dissent set dangerous
precedent when it stated its willingness "to consider the strong pos-
sibility of conviction" only because no "even moderately compli-
cated issues" were involved. 278
Another factor that courts should not consider in determining
how to dismiss cases under the Act concerns the ability of the prose-
cution to reinstate its case after dismissal, which was not at issue in
Taylor. Dismissing cases without prejudice in order to allow the
prosecution to promptly reinstate its case would provide "little in-
centive for the government to comply when it first arrested or in-
dicted an accused." 279 Moreover, such a practice could prove highly
prejudicial to the defendant, defeating the purposes of the Act.
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The principal contention of the dissent was its sharp disagree-
ment with the majority's conclusion that the district judge had
abused her discretion in dismissing Taylor with prejudice. 280 In-
deed, the conflict over the amount of deference that reviewing
courts should give to the findings of trial judges is prevalent
throughout the law.
Commentators have recognized the danger that discretionary
rulings, such as those made pursuant to the dismissal sanction, may
be inconsistent, arbitrary and "different in different men." 28 1 A lack
of faith in the idea that a "sole judge on the lowest rung of the judi-
cial ladder [can be] given unreviewable power" has led to a mistrust
in deferring to trial court discretion. 282 Appellate review has thus
been promoted as a safeguard against the possibility of abuse of dis-
cretion, 283 especially in cases such as Taylor, where the "appellate
court has as much before it as the trial judge did" in terms of
facts. 284
277 Id. at 2425 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 2420 n.9.
279 Steinberg, supra note 201, at 13-14.
280 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2424-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281 Burrows, Statutes and Judicial Discretion, 7 N.Z.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1976).
282 Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 635, 660 (1971).
283 Burrows, supra note 281, at 11.
284 Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 184 (1975).
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Indeed, the most persuasive argument advanced in favor of de-
ferring to trial judges' discretion is that the trial judge often has a
"feel of the case" 28 5 because of "the superiority of his nether posi-
tion." 2 86 This is the principal idea advanced by the dissent in
Taylor.28 7
It is clear that this argument is most suitable when factual find-
ings are at issue. 288 In Taylor, however, it does not appear that the
district court had access to any facts that were not also available to
the Supreme Court. Both sides submitted lengthy briefs. More-
over, none of the factual findings were disputed by either side. In
Taylor, only the interpretation and legal effects of the stipulated facts
were in question. Taylor, therefore, was precisely the sort of case
that was appropriate for appellate review. The majority concluded
that the district court had made not an erroneous determination of
fact, but legal errors. 289 It has long been established that the rule
precluding review of discretionary holdings does not apply where
errors of law, or mixed questions of fact and law as in Taylor, are at
issue.290
In Taylor, the Court determined that the district court had given
insufficient weight to a relevant consideration, Taylor's fault in caus-
ing the delay, and too much weight to irrelevant considerations,
such as the "unwitting" violation of the USMS. 29 1 Moreover, it be-
lieved that the district court, by employing dismissal with prejudice
as a vehicle to teach the government a lesson, had adopted a princi-
ple that was inconsistent with the policy of the Act. 29 2 Indeed, one
commentator has specifically stated that when a "statute conferring
... discretion lays down.., principles on which it is to be exercised,
a judge who fails to apply those principles is wrong. So is one who
applies a principle which is inconsistent with the policy or provisions
285 Id. (quoting Noonan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.
1967) (Friendly, J.)).
286 Rosenberg, supra note 282, at 663.
287 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2424-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
288 The primary case used in support of it is Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Bar-
rett, 246 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1957). The case involved a trial judge's determination that
the plaintiff's "twitching" of the head, sustained after an accident at work, was genuine.
Id. at 849. The trial judge's discretion was "based on facts or circumstances that are
critical to the decision and that the record imperfectly convey[ed]." See Rosenberg, supra
note 282, at 664.
289 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2419-20 ("A judgment that must be arrived at by considering
and applying statutory criteria... constitutes the application of law to fact and requires
the reviewing court to undertake more substantive scrutiny to ensure that [it] is sup-
ported in terms of the factors identified in the statute.").
290 See Bogardus v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 302 U.S. 34, 39 (1937).




of the statute." 293 Moreover, "the court's discretion will be upset if
it is apparent that no weight, or insufficient weight, has been given
to relevant considerations, or if weight has been given to irrelevant
considerations." 29 4
As one commentator has persuasively explained, the dismissal
sanction's balancing test should be treated as a question of law, jus-
tifying appellate review of the exercise of judicial discretion. 295
With respect to both the seriousness of the offense and the facts and
circumstances leading to the dismissal, the reviewing court has the
same information before it as the trial court; it has only to assess the
facts in terms of the Act, which is a question of law. 29 6 The final
factor, the impact of the decision on the administration of the Act
and justice, obviously involves an interpretative issue as well.297
What makes Taylor especially problematic is that there is disa-
greement as to how to interpret the balancing test factors, and
which factors are "relevant" for purposes of the Act. For example,
the question of whether sanctions should be used as a method of
encouraging future compliance is a factor that may or may not be
relevant depending on one's understanding of the policies underly-
ing the Act, that is, whether the defendant's or society's interests are
considered most important. When, as here, the relevant considera-
tions are open to debate, the abuse of discretion issue becomes con-
siderably more complex.
The majority contended that the trial court failed to sufficiently
"explicate its reasons for dismissing [Taylor] with prejudice." 2 98
293 Burrows, supra note 281, at 12.
294 Id. at 13.
295 See Steinberg, supra note 201, at 4.
296 Id. It might be argued that the majority improperly strayed into the range of fac-
tual findings when it stated that it saw no basis for the district court to have concluded
that the USMS' conduct was "lackadaisical," and that its "unwitting violation" was not in
bad faith. See Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2420-21, 2423. To the district court, bad faith appears
to have meant a conscious disregard for the time limits imposed by the Act, while the
Supreme Court seemed to use the term to refer to a malicious motive. Yet, the question
of how a purposeful 14-day delay designed not to harm the defendant but to achieve
efficiency, which was a stipulated fact, should weigh against the other balancing test
factors clearly calls for legal judgment.
297 Steinberg, supra note 201, at 4. Thus,
the crucial inquiries are whether the appellate court is situated in as good a position
as the lower court to resolve the issues raised and whether the trial court's findings
concern the effect or impact of certain events rather than disputed facts and witness
credibility. Since both of these questions must be answered in the affirmative, the
appellate court is "free from ... the 'clearly erroneous' rule," and may therefore
draw its own conclusions.
Id. (citing Kiwi Coders Corp. v. Acro Tool and Die Works, 250 F.2d 562, 568 (7th Cir.
1957)(citation omitted)).
298 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2420.
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One commentator has observed that it is essential for trial judges to
fully explain the basis of their discretionary decisions to permit
meaningful evaluation on appeal. 299 This _-easoning clearly applies
to certain cases that have arisen under the statute, in which trial
courts have simply stated that they weighed the factors and, provid-
ing no explanation at all, dismissed the case one way or the other.300
In Taylor, however, the trial judge indeed set forth an explana-
tion, based on which the Supreme Court felt confident to deduce
the ultimate rationale on which she had dismissed the case with prej-
udice. It is difficult to imagine what more the trial judge could have
said if she indeed believed that although the crime was serious, the
government's conduct was inexcusable and dismissal with prejudice
was the best way to avoid recurrences of it. The Court may have
validly believed that this constituted an abuse of discretion. Yet its
dwelling on the district court's inadequate explanation appears un-
warranted, and unnecessary to reach its conclusion.
One court has taken the position that "[t]he Act's multi-fac-
tored standard for deciding whether dismissals shall be with or with-
out prejudice invites an exercise of judicial discretion and thereby
implies a limited scope of review." 30' Thus, after a reviewing court
sets forth the proper interpretations and weight to be accorded to
the balancing test factors, it should remand the case to the district
court 3 0 2 It may be argued, however, that under this approach, the
reviewing court in essence dictates the result the district court must
reach, denying it actual discretion.
The dissent pointed out that Taylor will most likely encourage
district courts to avoid reversal by adopting a consistent practice of
dismissing cases without prejudice.30 3 This fear appears un-
founded: appellate courts have indeed reversed cases in favor of
dismissal with prejudice on the basis of abuse of discretion. In fact,
the majority seemed to take special care to avoid criticizing the deci-
sions of any other courts. It even cited with approval, for particular
propositions, cases which were dismissed with prejudice. 30 4 The
299 Rosenberg, supra note 282, at 665-66.
300 See United States v. laquinta, 515 F. Supp. 708 (N.D.W. Va. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 674 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1982). In Iaquinta, the court's entire explanation of its
decision went as follows: "Here, defendants have timely moved to dismiss the indict-
ments for violation of 3161(b). After considering the factors enumerated in the statute,
the Court must conclude that there has been a violation of the Act and that the man-
dated sanction is dismissal with prejudice." Id. at 712.
301 United States v.Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 1983).
302 See id.
303 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304 United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264 (11 th Cir. 1984)(reversing a district court
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Court also explicitly stated that its decision might well have been
different had the USMS repeatedly violated the Act or acted in bad
faith, as it defined it, towards Taylor.3 05 Moreover, the facts in Tay-
lor do not easily lend themselves to strict precedential adherence:
cases in which defendants largely contributed to the delayed trial
are rare, and future cases will usually be distinguishable on the facts.
Thus, although Taylor may have narrowed the range of appropriate
contexts for dismissals with prejudice, considerable flexibility re-
mains available to courts, provided they adhere to the policies un-
derlying the Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Taylor narrowed the range of cases which can properly be dis-
missed with prejudice under the dismissal sanction of the Speedy
Trial Act. The Court clarified ambiguities in the Act that had di-
vided the lower courts, potentially resulting in unequal treatment
for different defendants. The increased uniformity that will develop
among decisions arising under the Act satisfies one of its major
motivations.
Taylor also serves as a reminder to courts that although they
may disagree with the methods the Act employs to fulfill its aims,
they are not authorized to misapply the dismissal sanction to achieve
more efficient results. Taylor is faithful to both aims underlying the
Act in that it interprets the dismissal sanction's balancing test fac-
tors so as to respond to society's as well as the defendant's interests
in a speedy trial.
SUZANNE ISAACSON
decision to dismiss a case involving narcotics offenses without prejudice); United States
v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1983)(reversing a district court's decision to dismiss
a case involving mail theft without prejudice).
305 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 2420-21.
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